RISULTATI RICERCA

This study examines the long-run and short-run impact of GDP, urbanization, exports, agricultural activity, air travel, and electricity production on CO2 emissions in South Africa and Australia. Results from the ARDL model show that South Africa’s heavy reliance on coal for electricity generation significantly impacts CO2 emissions. Furthermore, South Africa’s urban population is associated with a concomitant increase in CO2 emission in the long-run. On the other hand, our results show that agricultural land and air transportation have a negative cor- relation with CO2 emissions in South Africa. These results are markedly different from Australia’s long-run estimates, where agricultural land is identified as the significant contributor to CO2 emissions. Additionally, urbanization in Australia is negatively related to CO2 emis- sions. The findings underscore a significant long-term policy challenge for Australia, as fac- tors such as electricity production, agricultural land usage, air travel, GDP, and exports in- crease CO2 emissions. In the case of South Africa, the policy challenge lies in developing policies that will help the country transition from coal-generated electricity to renewable energy and promote efficient urban planning policies.

The relationship between economic factors and environmental impacts is of paramount significance in the pursuit of sustainable development and the implementation of effective measures to alleviate environmental deterioration. This research utilizes the VECM, FMOLS, CCR, and DOLS methodologies to examine the relationship between income inequality and CO2 emissions spanning from 1990 to 2022 in Turkey. Theoretical frameworks such as Boyce’s socio-economic dynamics, Veblen’s pecuniary emulation theory, and the marginal propensity to emit provide detailed insights into the complex relationship between economic inequality and environmental degradation. In synthesizing the literature on income inequality and CO2 emissions, we observe a wide spectrum of findings ranging from positive to negative associations, with some studies yielding inconclusive results in different nations and areas. Beyond income inequality, this research considers a wider range of CO2 explanatory factors, such as GDP per capita, industrial value added, energy consumption, renewable energy, population density, and the Gini index. The estimates reveal that income per capita, industrial value added, energy consumption, and population density show positive linkages with CO2 emissions. On the other hand, renewable energy share and income inequality reflect negative associations with CO2 emissions. Notably, an increase in the Gini coefficient, reflecting worse income distribution, is associated with a reduction in CO2 emissions in Turkey.

Energy supply is responsible of more than 80% of anthropogenic carbon emissions whose rapid accumulation in the atmosphere is in turn responsible of unsustainable global warming (overshoot of 1.5 °C) to avoid which carbon neutrality should be achieved in a few decades. “Accelerating” the (supposed) decarbonization of energy supply in sectors different of power generation is commonly considered a necessary step to reach such a goal. Nevertheless, this article points out that (at least in principle) this kind of “acceleration” (e.g. through indis- criminate targets and stringent policy provisions, including over-subsidies for RES producers) might not be desirable. In fact, the allocation of renewables (among different uses, different abatement carriers and over time) is by no means a trivial choice. To explain why, we focus on thermal and transport sectors and analyse the main energy carriers of abatement (electrifi- cation, biomethane and hydrogen), looking for intertemporal and interspatial optimization of renewables allocation, by estimating the LSCOA (levelized social cost of abatement), and by accounting for uncertainty about energy prices and renewable costs. The principal conclusion is that, before electricity supply is fully decarbonised, only greenfield biomethane should be allocated to thermal and transport uses, in the meantime “accelerating” the allocation of elec- tric renewables to power generation. Only when this latter is almost completely decarbonised, policies should promote deep green (now really) electrification of thermal (not “hard to abate”) and transport (light-duty) uses. Otherwise, the risk is to significantly slow down the entire process of energy supply decarbonization, and even to undermine the achievement of the climate targets. Finally, regarding green hydrogen, it should be allocated to the so-called “hard to abate” uses (including heavy transport) and to improve (as storage option) electric renewable competitiveness

Geothermal energy has great potential to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of the energy sector, thus contributing to the realization of EU targets and, of course, those ones set for Hungary. The country has excellent geological and geographical conditions, well known due to the existing databases as well as the know-how to guarantee a high-level utilization of this renewable energy source. Still, only a small part of the estimated potential is utilized and the previous programming period, 2014-2020 did not change this situation significantly. On one hand, the poor planning of the Széchenyi 2020 Programme, on the other hand, the lack of risk management measures, discourage investors and provide a competitive advantage for other renewable energy systems over geothermal, especially for biomass. The present paper pro- vides a comprehensive overview of the EU co-financed support of geothermal energy in the period 2014-2020, identifying relevant calls and successful projects. A questionnaire survey among successful applicants is the other pillar of the article. The critical analysis and recom- mendations of the development policy may contribute to a more efficient support of geother- mal energy in the following programming period(s).

In 2016, by signing and ratifying the Paris Agreement, the European Union committed to making the EU economy and society climate neutral by 2050. In 2016, partly because of this goal, the European Council endorsed an interim target of a 55% net domestic reduction in climate-changing gas emissions by 2030. The transport sector is among those called upon to make the greatest effort, both because of its percentage weight (25% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions) and its progress to date (-10% from 1990 levels). Recent regulatory measures suggest that there is still much work to be accomplished to attain climate neutrality in the transportation sector. The paper examines the impact of vehicle emission performance stand- ards (443/2009/EC; 333/2014/EU; 2019/1242/EU; 2019/631/EU; 2023/851/EU) on the sup- ply and demand of cars in the EU automotive market and tests the consistency of the ongoing transformations with the Paris Agreement. Although changes in both production and purchase have been made in the direction desired (perhaps mandated) by policy makers, it appears that the scale of these is not meeting the required timeline. Much remains to be done to eliminate options, such as fuel decarbonization, which can effectively reduce the carbon footprint of the road fleet.

The Spanish Government presented in June 2023 the update of the National Energy and Cli- mate Plan 2023-2030. The update entails a very significant increase in ambition, with further reductions in GHG emissions and larger shares of renewables, as compared to the first NECP. In this paper we review the major changes presented in the update and assess the extent to which this increased ambition is backed up by a strengthening of the policies required. Un- fortunately, the assessment is not positive: the measures proposed are not expected to bring about the emissions reductions required.

The draft Plan presented by the Italian Government in July 2023 (NECP-23) is more than an update of the NECP submitted in 2019 for many reasons: the change of political majority, with different points of view from the previous one, has added to the significant increase in the EU’s targets for 2030 and the change in the international energy landscape that began with the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Italy’s NECP-23 is very complex and time-consuming to review because it must comply with the extremely detailed requirements of the Governance Regulation of the Energy Union along five dimensions. To simplify the task, this article focuses above all on the three traditional EU goals: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing energy efficiency and expanding the share of renewable sources (RES). The first part presents the objectives and results that Italy expects to achieve by 2030 with existing policies and with additional measures, some of which will however be indicated in the final version of the updated Plan to be sent in 2024. Then, among the “at least 125” tools and measures that the Plan says have been adopted to achieve the targets set by the EU for Italy, a few considered fundamental are examined, also indicating what the past experience has been. Finally, after having noted that the draft plan states that Italy will encounter diffi- culties in reducing emissions and energy consumption as requested by the EU while she be- lieves that the RES development targets can be attained, the possibility that the main policies contained in the plan can give the expected results is assessed.

Germany’s NECP 2023 is a long-awaited and particularly complex exercise. It is eagerly awaited because it comes after the energy shock of 2022, and at a time when the long-term consequences for Germany will be difficult to overcome. Complex because, even before the energy crisis, Germany’s 2030 targets looked particularly challenging, requiring it to double the rate of decarbonisation of the previous decade (while completing the phase-out of nuclear power). In this context, the autumn 2023 version is clearly a “work in progress” which, while covering the five dimensions of the exercise, reveals significant limitations: in the precision of the proposed measures and, despite these imprecisions, in the assessment of their scope, leaving little hope of achieving the decarbonisation objectives by 2030 (as also considered by the Federal Court of Auditors). Admittedly, this observation is not entirely specific to Ger- many, but given the position of this economy within the EU, broader questions are raised about the progress towards Fit-for-55.

France’s National Energy-Climate Plan (PNEC), presented in October 2023, is structured around the Multiannual Energy Program (PPE) and the National Low-Carbon Strategy (SNBC). These documents describe France’s energy and climate strategies for the next dec- ade, aiming for carbon neutrality by 2050 and a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emis- sions by 2030 (-50% compared to 1990). The plan focuses on increasing the share of renew- able energies and nuclear power, while reducing fossil fuel consumption. By 2030, 58% of energy consumption should come from low-carbon sources. The plan recognizes that there are a number of unanswered questions, such as how to guarantee sufficient flexibility, and how to determine the necessary investment in electricity grids. In addition, electricity market reform and the fight against energy poverty are essential elements in ensuring a just transition, a particularly sensitive subject in France since the Yellow Vests crisis.

This contribution constitutes an introduction to the special issue of EPEE dedicated to the examination of four updates of the integrated National Energy-Climate Plan (NECP) which follows the other special issue published in 2019 (EPEE, no 1/2019) when the first version of the Plans for 2030 has been prepared. The NECP-2023 differ from the NECP-2019 signifi- cantly, first of all because the EU in the meantime has raised the targets for 2030 significantly following the approval of the “Climate law” in 2021, which commits the EU to reaching the goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in 2050. But, in addition to the change in the tar- gets, the entire framework of energy-climate policy has changed profoundly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine which brought the issue of security of energy supplies (particularly gas) in Europe back to the foreground. First, this introduction, to allow the reader to understand how the EU came to decide the com- mon objectives and those of the Member States (MS) and how the NECPs examined in the special issue are structured, traces the history of the last 60 years of the European energy and climate policy. The next section summarizes the assessment that the European Commission made of the provisional update of the NECPs which was presented by the MS in the second half of 2023. Finally, some salient points highlighted by the experts who examined the NECPs of France and Germany, Italy and Spain are reported.

This article describes the most meaningful developments at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP-28) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which took place in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 30 – December 13, 2023. This is done, in part, by reflecting on the history of these annual meetings, drawing on the author’s experience of participating annually over a period of sixteen years. This history reveals the evolution over time that has taken place in the relative importance in the annual meetings of the official negotiations compared with the simultaneous participation of civil society. The press coverage of COP-28 is examined, along with the important role played by two countries – China and the United States, the dramatic increase in attention given to methane, and two disappointments, one associated with funding for adaptation, and the other connected with provisions for carbon markets.