The Diffusion of Due Behaviour: A Note to Hayek’s Juridical Theory
Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Salvatore Spagano
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2014/1
Language Italian Pages 14 P. 147-160 File size 168 KB
DOI 10.3280/EP2014-001007
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This work deals with an unresolved question left open by Hayek: which are the circumstances that lead to prefer a formalized rule to a spontaneous one? This paper suggests that spontaneous and formal rules do not cancel out each other, but are the results of two distinct approaches on just one reality, which did not catch its dynamic indivisibility. It is true that a behavioural rule survives thanks to its efficiency, but it is not true that the autopoiesis of the norm is efficient per se.
Keywords: Social norms, evolutionary economics, Hayek
Jel codes: A12, D02, K10
Salvatore Spagano, La diffusione del comportamento dovuto: una postilla alla teorica giuridica di Hayek in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 1/2014, pp 147-160, DOI: 10.3280/EP2014-001007