Cohesion and Territorial Self-Interest: The Distribution of Public Expenditure among Italian Regions

The analysis of data on territorialized public expenditure has long given rise to a debate, also due to irreconcilable statistical sources (CPT vs. RGS and ISTAT). In the accounting data of the State General Accounting Office (Ragioneria di Stato), which also include indirect expenditure, public spending appears slightly differentiated territorially between the Center-North and the South. The difference depends on the special statute regions with linguistic minorities and the Region of the Capital and the distribution of pensions. Once the effect of these anomalous regions and of pension benefits funded by contributions is removed, expenditure proves to be higher in the South. In the statistics of the Territorial Public Accounts (Conti Pubblici Territoriali), which is seriously inconsistent with National Accounts, applying the two aforementioned corrections, the difference is insignificant. Smaller regions receive larger transfers both in the South and in the Center-North. In some territorial contexts, the distribution of public resources relative to GDP is such as to cast doubt on the persistence of proper incentives to work in the private sector, and it generates significant rent-seeking incentives

Keywords: public expenditure, cohesion, Mezzogiorno, fiscal residuum.

Jel codes: H76, R10

Giuseppe Coco, Coesione ed egoismo territoriale. La distribuzione della spesa pubblica tra regioni italiane in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 2/2025, pp 183-202, DOI: 10.3280/EP2025-002002