I contratti di programma: una questione di multitask?
Journal title ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE
Author/s Rosanna Nisticò
Publishing Year 2009 Issue 2009/1
Language Italian Pages 29 P. 93-121 File size 648 KB
DOI 10.3280/POLI2009-001007
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"Contratti di programma": a matter of multitask? - In the light of the results from a wide empirical investigation, this essay examines some crucial characteristics of the Italian policy measure called Contratti di programma through both the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts literature and the multi-task Principal-Agent theory. The Contratti di programma policy is based on a formal agreement between the Italian Government and private firms to carry on an investment programme comprising a number of different projects (industrial investments; workers training programs; research centres and projects). The essay also provides a number of suggestions for improving the effectiveness of this policy.
Keywords: multitask, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, industrial policy
Parole chiave: multitask, informazione asimmetrica, contratti incompleti, contratti di programma, politica industriale
Jel Classification: D82; D86; L14; L52
Rosanna Nisticò, I contratti di programma: una questione di multitask? in "ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE " 1/2009, pp 93-121, DOI: 10.3280/POLI2009-001007