L’attribuzione della vigilanza bancaria alla BCE: un approccio di political economy
Journal title ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO
Author/s Elena Seghezza
Publishing Year 2017 Issue 2016/3
Language Italian Pages 0 P. 423-438 File size 463 KB
DOI 10.3280/ED2016-003005
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At its establishment the ECB was not granted, beside the monetary function, responsibility for banking supervision. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2011 have prompted policymakers and economists to reconsider the issue. In this contribution we trace the process that led to the allocation of supervisory functions to the ECB. This process is presented as the outcome of negotiations between different political actors. In their interaction these actors can lead to alliances and coalitions. Like the other political players also international institutions have phases in which their power increases and phases in which their power decreases. During the recent financial crisis, the ECB has played a crucial role in preserving the integrity of the Eurozone. Because of this, its political influence has increased significantly. Taking advantage of this factor, the ECB has been able to extend its power by acquiring the responsibility for supervision of Eurozone banks.
Keywords: ECB, banking supervision, political actors, political economy.
Jel codes: G21, G28, E58
Elena Seghezza, L’attribuzione della vigilanza bancaria alla BCE: un approccio di political economy in "ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO " 3/2016, pp 423-438, DOI: 10.3280/ED2016-003005