Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni’s Quest for Contractual Settlements

Journal title HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY
Author/s Nicola Giocoli
Publishing Year 2025 Issue 2025/1
Language English Pages 21 P. 59-79 File size 91 KB
DOI 10.3280/SPE2025-001004
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The paper explores Maffeo Pantaleoni’s 1898 essay, focusing on his analysis of why rational agents enter mutualistic agreements, i.e. contracts, despite common predatory and parasitic behaviors. Pantaleoni classifies social relationships into predatory, parasitic, and mutualistic categories, anticipating the zero-sum logic where wealth is redistributed rather than created. The paper highlights the limitations of Pantaleoni’s neglect of the legal system in shaping contracts, contrasting his ideas with legal realism, which emphasizes law’s role in reducing transaction costs. It also connects Pantaleoni’s work with John Rogers Commons’s theory, extending his ideas into modern institutional economics.

Keywords: Maffeo Pantaleoni, sociology, contracts, zero-sum logic, legal realism, John Rogers Commons

Jel codes: B13, K10, P48

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Nicola Giocoli, Strong, Weak, and Zero-Sum: A Commonsean Solution to Maffeo Pantaleoni’s Quest for Contractual Settlements in "HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY" 1/2025, pp 59-79, DOI: 10.3280/SPE2025-001004