Three approaches to overcome compartmentalization: A brief epistemological analysis

Titolo Rivista RIVISTA DI PSICOLOGIA CLINICA
Autori/Curatori Nicolò Gaj
Anno di pubblicazione 2024 Fascicolo 2024/1
Lingua Inglese Numero pagine 17 P. 103-119 Dimensione file 0 KB
DOI 10.3280/rpc1-2024oa17127
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più clicca qui

Vedi l'articolo Scarica l'articolo open access

FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA)associazione indipendente e non profit per facilitare (attraverso i servizi tecnologici implementati da CrossRef.org) l’accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche

The authors of the target article (Salvatore et al., 2022) provided an in-depth analysis of the features and the causes of professional psychology’s fragmentation, generally referred to as compartmentalization. The present contribution is a critical reflection on the three approaches aimed at overcoming it. In conclusion, some preliminary remarks are presented regarding the primary components that a theory of practice should encompass.

The authors of the target article (Salvatore et al., 2022) provided an in-depth analysis of the features and the causes of professional psychology’s fragmentation, generally referred to as compartmentalization. The present contribution is a critical reflection on the three approaches aimed at overcoming it. In conclusion, some preliminary remarks are presented regarding the primary components that a theory of practice should encompass.

Parole chiave:; Professional Psychology; Unity in psychology; conceptual analysis; theory of practice

  1. Bennett, M. R. & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Blackwell.
  2. Blackburn, S. (2005). The Oxford dictionary of philosophy. Second edition revised. Oxford University Press.
  3. Brinkmann, S. (2002). Minds, brains, or persons? What is psychology about? In B. D. Slife, S. C. Yanchar & F. C. Richardson (eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Theoretical and Philosophi-cal Psychology (pp. 13-29), Routledge.
  4. Brock A. C. (2015). The history of psychological objects. In J. Martin, J. Sugarman & K. L. Slaney (eds.), The Wiley Handbook of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology: Methods, Approaches, and New Directions for Social Sciences. First edition (pp. 151-165), John Wiley & Sons.
  5. Corradini A. (2017). La frammentazione della psicologia: alcune riflessioni epistemologiche. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, 3, 565-568. DOI: 10.1421/88358
  6. Danziger K. (1985). The methodological imperative in psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 15(1), 1-13. DOI: 10.1177/004839318501500101
  7. Danziger K. (1990). Constructing the subject. Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge University Press.
  8. Danziger K. (1997). Naming the mind. How psychology found its language. Sage.
  9. Danziger K. (2008). Marking the mind: A history of memory. Cambridge University Press.
  10. Dupré J. (1993). The disorder of things. Metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science. Harvard University Press.
  11. Fletcher G. (1995). The scientific credibility of folk psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
  12. Feser E. (2005). Philosophy of mind. A beginner’s guide. Oneworld Publications.
  13. Gaj N. (2016). Unity and fragmentation in psychology. The philosophical and methodological roots of the discipline. Routledge.
  14. Gaj N. (2017). La psicologia tra scienza e professione: riflessioni per una teoria della pratica. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, 3, 599-605. DOI: 10.1421/88364
  15. Gaj N. (2018). Psychology between science and technology: A proposal for the development of a theory of practice. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 38(2), 77-91. DOI: 10.1037/teo0000081
  16. Gaj N. (2021). Why the professional practice of psychology requires a personalistic account of psychological phenomena. Theory & Psychology, 31(4), 573-591. DOI: 10.1177/0959354321989434
  17. Hacking I. (1995). Rewriting the soul: Multiple personality and the science of memory. Princeton University Press.
  18. Hacking I. (1999). The social construction of what? Harvard University Press.
  19. Henriques G. (2017). Achieving a unified clinical science requires a metatheoretical solution: Comment on Melchert (2016). American Psychologist, 72(4), 393-394. DOI: 10.1037/amp0000143
  20. Hibberd F. J., Petocz A. (2022). Philosophy, realism and psychology’s disciplinary fragmentation. Philosophical Psychology, 36(3), 621-649. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2081542
  21. Lamiell J. T. (2010). Wiliam Stern (1871-1938): A brief introduction to his life and works. Pabst Science Publishers.
  22. Martin J., Sugarman J., Thompson J. (2003). Psychology and the ques-tion of agency. State University of New York Press.
  23. Morrison M. (2011). One phenomenon, many models: Inconsistency and complementarity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42, 342-351. DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.042
  24. Nagel E. (1961). The structure of science. Problems of logic of scientific explanation. Hackett.
  25. Nelson H. G., Stolterman E. (2014). The design way. Intentional change in an unpredictable world. Second edition. MIT Press.
  26. Richards G. (2002). The psychology of psychology. A historically grounded sketch. Theory and Psychology, 12(1), 7-36. DOI: 10.1177/0959354302121002
  27. Salvatore S. et al. (2022). Compartmentalization and unity of profes-sional psychology. A road map for the future of the discipline. Rivista di Psicologia Clinica, 1. DOI: 10.3280/rpc1-2022oa14450
  28. Sternberg R. J., Grigorenko E., Kalmar D. (2001). The role of theory in unified psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 21(2), 99-117. DOI: 10.1037/h0091200
  29. Von Wright G. H. (1971). Explanation and understanding. Cornell University Press.

Nicolò Gaj, Three approaches to overcome compartmentalization: A brief epistemological analysis in "RIVISTA DI PSICOLOGIA CLINICA" 1/2024, pp 103-119, DOI: 10.3280/rpc1-2024oa17127