The influence of enforcement of contract on the quality of performance in public procurement: a theoretical overview
Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Guido Tatone
Publishing Year 2017 Issue 2016/2
Language Italian Pages 23 P. 107-129 File size 233 KB
DOI 10.3280/EP2016-002004
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This paper is a review of recent approaches to the analysis of public procurement problems where the quality is not perfectly assessable. First, we show the main results of models which analyse a similar issue in a competitive market framework. Then we analyse the papers which face this subject in a context of public procurement using the concept of reputation for past behaviour as the basis to punish opportunistic sellers. In particular, we discuss Kim’s results (1998) about the leaving out of sellers with bad reputation from selective tenders, and Doni’s ones (2005) about the use by Public Administration of a policy for rewarding good reputation. Finally, we refer to the advantages arising from the adoption of "reputation-regarding" auctions (Tatone, 2007).
Keywords: Public procurement, auction theory, enforcement of contract, non-contractible quality
Jel codes: D82, H57, L14
- La reputazione negli appalti pubblici: uno strumento socialmente desiderabile per risolvere il problema dello scadimento qualitativo Guido Tatone, in ECONOMIA PUBBLICA 1/2018 pp.59
DOI: 10.3280/EP2018-001003
Guido Tatone, L’influenza dell’enforcement contrattuale sulla qualità della prestazione negli appalti pubblici: una rassegna teorica in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 2/2016, pp 107-129, DOI: 10.3280/EP2016-002004